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Abstract: We consider market dynamics in a reduced form model. In
the simplest version, there are two investors and several small non-
investing firms. In each period, one investor can acquire a small firm,
the other investor decides about market entry. After that all firms
play an oligopoly game. We derive conditions under which increasing
market concentration arises with myopic firms, we show that a model
with forward-looking firms and with arbitrary numbers of investors
yield similar results. We apply the framework to a Cournot model
with cost synergies and a Bertrand model where acquisitions extend
the product spectrum of a firm.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the circumstances under which acquisition as a force
towards concentration dominates over entry as a countervailing force.1 Cate-
gorizing possible market dynamics in the broadest possible way, the following
four types of stylized patterns are conceivable: (1) acquisitions without entry,
(2) entry without acquisitions, (3) acquisitions with simultaneous entry, (4)
neither acquisitions nor entry. If one is willing to abstract from details, all
four examples arise in the real world.
(1) The British beer industry underwent a period of concentration in the
nineteen fifties and sixties (Sutton 1991). Large brewers acquired small
ones to gain access to their retail outlets, i.e. pubs. At the same time,
there was very little entry.
(2) The personal computer industry in the early 1980s provides the oppo-
site example of a market with massive entry, but virtually no acquisi-
tions, resulting in a growth of firm numbers from 8 in 1980 to 51 in
1986 (see Stavins, 1995).
(3) The European airline market exhibits simultaneous acquisitions and
entry: Following European deregulation in 1997, national flag carriers
took over small regional airlines while, at the same time, low fare start-
ups found their niches by supplying products diﬀerentiated from the
supply of the big airliners2. Also, Pesendorfer (2002) describes how
new firms regularly enter the software industry and the toy industry,
but are acquired soon afterwards.
(4) Finally, in the market for corporate law in the United States, neither
entry nor acquisitions played an important role, resulting in a largely
1We fully acknowledge that by restricting ourselves to acquisitions and entry we ignore
internal investment and exit as important forces of structural change.
2See The Economist (1997) and (2001).
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stable market structure. Despite dramatic changes in the legal market
(a proliferation of regulations and law suits) the same law firms as in
1985 still dominate the legal market for corporate law and litigation.3
We analyze which circumstances generate dynamics of type (1) - (4),
respectively. In our model, large firms can acquire small firms, and there
is potential entry. Both activities are costly. We then ask under which
circumstances it is more likely for large firms to bear the costs of acquisition
than it is for small firms to enter.
In each period, an ”investment stage” is followed by (reduced form) prod-
uct market competition. All but two firms play a passive role in the invest-
ment stage — by assumption, they cannot invest. These passive firms are
called small incumbents. Of the remaining two firms, one is a potential
entrant whose investment is market entry. A firm that enters will not be
distinguishable from a small incumbent thereafter. The other remaining firm
is called a large incumbent. It is best to think of the large firm as being
the result of sequential acquisitions of small (unit size) firms — its size then
describes how many constituent small firms it consists of. By assumption,
only the large firm is allowed to acquire others. Acquiring competitors has
two potential benefits. First, the reduction in the number of competitors in-
creases equilibrium profits. Second, there may be advantages to being large
— for instance, due to economies of scale or scope. The extent to which such
synergies arise is a parameter of the model — in principle there may even be
negative synergies.
Thus, the investment stage is a two-player game between the large in-
cumbent and the potential entrant where each firm can choose between two
actions — ”investment” (acquisition/entry) or ”non-investment”. Some com-
plexity arises, however, because acquisition costs themselves should depend
on market structure.4
We give a complete description of the equilibrium structure for the static
model, where only one period is considered. In particular, we identify the
3See The Economist (2000).
4They are most reasonably interpreted as a compensation to the owners of the acquired
firm for not earning product market profit.
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circumstances under which a strong concentration equilibrium arises in which
there is acquisition, but no entry. Most importantly, a stronger positive
impact of an increase in own size on the large incumbent’s profits, a stronger
positive profit eﬀect of a reduction in the number of competitors, and greater
intensity of competition, defined as low profit levels of small firms, make such
equilibria more likely.
The results from the static model provide useful inputs for dynamic con-
siderations. First, we allow firms to make repeated myopic investments and
give conditions for self-reinforcing concentration. Second, we show that the
comparative statics for the myopic model essentially carry over to a two-
period model with forward-looking firms.
We apply our framework to two examples: a linear Cournot model where
acquisitions involve synergies from cost reductions and a model of diﬀerenti-
ated price competition where an acquisition expands the product spectrum
of the large firm. The dynamics of these models reveal interesting diﬀerences.
In the synergy model, initial conditions (number of small firms, size of large
firm) strongly influence the long-term behavior of the system: Monopoliza-
tion only arises if the initial number of firms is already suﬃciently small,
and/or the large firm is suﬃciently small. In the variety model, concentra-
tion increases for arbitrary initial values.
We extend our two-player static game to a setting in which several in-
cumbents are able to acquire and several firms may enter the market. We
then give suﬃcient conditions for large firms to invest at least as much as
small firms. Self-reinforcing concentration arises under conditions quite simi-
lar to the myopic two-player market dynamics model, even though additional
countervailing forces arise.
The paper relates to several strands of literature. Several authors con-
sider endogenous changes in market dominance for given firm numbers. They
describe circumstances under which firms that are ahead of others in terms
of some state variable can increase their lead over time.5 This literature suf-
fers from the obvious drawback that it does not deal with mergers or market
5Variants of these approaches include incremental investment games (Flaherty 1980),
learning-by-doing models (Cabral and Riordan 1994) or switching cost models (Beggs and
Klemperer 1992); Athey and Schmutzler (2001) provide an integrated approach.
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entry. Nevertheless, the conditions for increasing dominance in such mod-
els resemble our conditions for increasing concentration. Models of market
dynamics allowing for changes in firm numbers include Ericson and Pakes
(1995) and Gowrisankaran (1999). While the set-up of these papers is more
general than ours, we add to them by relating explicit conditions for increas-
ing concentration to the nature of the underlying oligopolistic competition.
Pesendorfer (2002) is closely related in the sense that he also focuses on
mergers and entry. However, he pursues a very diﬀerent objective from ours:
He demonstrates that in situations where mergers reduce short-term profits
of the participants, strategic long-term considerations can make them prof-
itable. Issues of firm heterogeneity and entry incentives that are central to
our paper are not addressed.6
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our model. In
section 3, we characterize static equilibria. Section 4 contains dynamic con-
siderations. Section 5 discusses examples. Section 6 sketches a generalization
to more than two investing firms. Section 7 contains a discussion of our re-
sults and prospects for future research.
2 The Model
We consider a market over periods t = 1, ..., T ≤ ∞. In each period, large in-
cumbents, small incumbents and potential entrants play an investment game,
followed by product market competition; at the beginning of period t, the
total number of firms is N t−1. Each firm i’s size at the beginning of the
investment stage of period t is summarized by a state variable Y t−1i ∈ N.
For incumbents, Y t−1i > 0. If Y
t−1
i = 1, an incumbent is called small, oth-
erwise large. For entrants, Y t−1i = 0. The initial state Y
0 = (Y 01 , ..., Y
0
I ) is
exogenous.
Large firms can invest in every period. Their investment consists of ac-
quiring a small firm. By assumption, an acquisition increases the state of
the acquiring firm by 1 and reduces the state of the acquiree to 0. Also, by
6By concentrating on homogeneous firms and essentially making entry exogenous, Pe-
sendorfer can analyze Markov-perfect equilibria. The price we pay for allowing hetero-
geneity and endogenizing entry is that our dynamic treatment is more rudimentary.
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assumption small firms cannot invest. For entrants, investment means enter-
ing the market. For simplicity, we assume that an entrant can only enter as
a small firm. Thus, given all initial states Y t−1i , firms simultaneously choose
investment levels ati ∈ {0, 1}, and the new state of the investing firms is
Y ti = Y
t−1
i + a
t
i.
The relation between states and profits is summarized in the following
assumptions.
(A1) For every vector Yt = (Y t1 , ..., Y
t
N t), there exists a unique profile of
equilibrium payoﬀs Πi (Yt) for i = 1, ..., N t in each period t.
(A2) Profits are exchangeable: that is, first, for any firm i a permutation
of the vector Yt−i does not change the profits of firm i,
7 and second,
if i 6= j such that Y ti = Y tj and Yt−i is identical with Yt−j up to a
permutation then Πi (Yt) = Πj (Yt).
(A3) ∂Π
i
∂Y tj
< 0 for j 6= i: that is, other things being equal, profits are lower
the higher the state of the competitor.
(A4) Πi (Yt) = 0 if Y ti = 0.
Except for section 6, we consider the following special case:
(A5) In each period t ≥ 1, there are only two firms that can invest: one large
firm, namely i = 1, and one potential entrant, denoted as et.
By (A2), the product market profit of each small firm is fully determined
by the state of the large firm and the total number F t = F t−1 + atet − at1 of
small firms in the industry, and similarly for the large firm. Thus, we denote
small firms’ profits as ΠS (Y t1 , F
t) and large firms’ profits as ΠL (Y t1 , F
t),
respectively.8 Entry costs are exogenous, given as E > 0. Acquisition costs,
however, are influenced by the outside options of small firms. Their owners
will only agree to a takeover if the profits they could earn with a small firm
7As usual, Y−i stands for the vector of states of all firms except firm i.
8For instance, suppose, Y t1 = M ≥ 2, Y t2 = Y t3 = Y t4 = 1. Then profits for firm 1 are
ΠL (M, 3) = Π1 (M, 1, 1, 1) and ΠS (M, 3) = Πi (M, 1, 1, 1) for firms i = 2, 3, 4.
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in the market are not higher than what they get as a compensation for the
takeover. By (A3), small firm profits are decreasing in the size of the large
firm and the number of small competitors.9 Thus, the following assumption
is natural.
(A6) Acquisition costs are a function AC(Y t1 , F
t) that is decreasing in both
variables.
3 The Static Game
The payoﬀs of the one-period game are presented in Table 1.
< Table 1 about here >
The Nash-equilibria are straightforward to derive. All conceivable con-
stellations of pure strategy equilibria arise for suitable parameters. We give
explicit conditions for the strong concentration equilibrium
¡
at1, a
t
et
¢
= (1, 0)
Proposition 1 (a) Each of the following seven equilibrium constellations is
possible for some set of parameters:
(a1) Unique equilibria [(0, 0) , (0, 1) , (1, 0) or (1, 1)] .
(a2) Multiple pure strategy equilibria [(0, 0) / (1, 1) or (0, 1) / (1, 0)].
(a3) No pure strategy equilibria.10
(b) The strong concentration equilibrium (1, 0) arises as a unique pure strat-
egy equilibrium if the following conditions hold simultaneously.11
9Note, however, that ∂Πs/∂Y t1 < 0 from assumption (A3) does not exclude the pos-
sibility of positive acquisition externalities on small firms’ profits. Positive externalities
might still arise even though there is a negative impact of a larger competitor on the small
firm profit, because an acquisition simultanously reduces the number of firms competing
in the market, which increases profits of the remaining firms.
10A full description of the equilibrium structure, which we require in our later numerical
examples, is available on request from the authors.
11For existence, it suﬃces that conditions (ENT1) and (ACQ0) hold with weak
inequality.
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(i) ΠS
¡
Y t−11 + 1, F
t−1¢ < E. (ENT1)
(ii) ΠL
¡
Y t−11 + 1, F
t−1 − 1
¢
−ΠL
¡
Y t−11 , F
t−1¢ > AC ¡Y t−11 + 1, F t−1 − 1¢
(ACQ0)
(iii) ΠS
¡
Y t−11 + 1, F
t−1¢ < E or (ENT0)
ΠL
¡
Y t−11 + 1, F
t−1¢−ΠL ¡Y t−11 , F t−1 + 1¢ > AC ¡Y t−11 + 1, F t−1¢
(ACQ1)
The proof involves straightforward checks of best response conditions. For
instance, (ENT1) is the no-entry condition and (ACQ0) is the acquisition
condition.12 Together they guarantee existence. (ENT0) or (ACQ1) gives
uniqueness.
To interpret proposition 1(b), define the net entry eﬀect (NEE) on the
entrant’s profit as
NEE = ΠS
¡
Y t−11 + 1, F
t−1¢− E
and the net acquisition eﬀect (NAE) on the incumbent’s profit as
NAE = ΠL
¡
Y t−11 + 1, F
t−1 − 1
¢
−ΠL
¡
Y t−11 , F
t−1¢−AC ¡Y t−11 + 1, F t−1 − 1¢ .
The strong concentration equilibrium exists when NAE ≥ 0 ≥ NEE. Thus,
a necessary condition for the strong concentration equilibrium is that the net
investment eﬀect NIE on profits is at least as large for acquisitions than for
entry. Clearly,
OSE = ΠL
¡
Y t−11 + 1, F
t−1 − 1
¢
− ΠL
¡
Y t−11 , F
t−1 − 1
¢
MSE = ΠL
¡
Y t−11 , F
t−1 − 1
¢
− ΠL
¡
Y t−11 , F
t−1¢ .
OSE is the own state eﬀect, describing how the higher own state after an
acquisition translates into (usually) higher profits. MSE is the market struc-
12The numerical symbol in the conditions denotes the opponent player’s action. For
instance, (ENT1) says that entry is not profitable for the entrant, given that the large
firms plays at1 = 1.
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ture eﬀect, which isolates the profit increase resulting from the elimination
of one competitor. Then, we have
NAE = OSE +MSE − AC
¡
Y t−11 + 1, F
t−1 − 1
¢
.
Thus, if profit reacts strongly to an increase in the own state, (ACQ0) and
(ACQ1) are more easily fulfilled, as OSE tends to be large. Further, if the
adverse eﬀect of an additional competitor on one’s own profit is higher, the
acquisition condition is also more easily fulfilled, as MSE is larger. Finally,
if small firms earn lower profits, conditions (ENT0) and (ENT1) are more
easily met. The last case, lower small firm profits, can be regarded as an
instance of more intense competition.13 Thus, more intense competition may
help foster concentration.14
4 Beyond the Static Game
We now move towards dynamic considerations. First, we ask under which
conditions concentration trends are self-reinforcing for myopic firms. Then,
we deal with forward-looking firms in a two-period version of the game.
4.1 The Repeated Myopic Game
Suppose firms make myopic investment choices in each period, taking only
those eﬀects on product market competition into account that arise in the im-
mediately following period. Under which circumstances will a strong concen-
tration equilibrium in period 1 make the conditions for such an equilibrium
easier to fulfill in period 2, that is, under which conditions is concentration
self-reinforcing? The following terminology is useful.
13For a related discussion of the notion ”increasing competition”, see Boone (2001).
14Note, however, that this statement is of a ceteris-paribus type. In models of homoge-
neous good price competition with Y1 corresponding to (the negative of) marginal costs,
there will be no incentive for acquisitoins if the large firm already has suﬃciently low costs:
Even though small firm profits (and thus acquisition costs) are zero, the same is true for
OSE and MSE.
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Definition 1 (1) There are positive (negative) acquisition externalities at¡
Y t−11 , F
t−1¢ if ΠS ¡Y t−11 + 1, F t−1 − 1¢ > (<)ΠS ¡Y t−11 , F t−1¢ .
(2) There are increasing (decreasing) acquisition costs at
¡
Y t−11 , F
t−1¢ if
AC
¡
Y t−11 + 1, F
t−1 − 1
¢
> (<)AC
¡
Y t−11 , F
t−1¢ .
(3) Acquisition incentives are self-reinforcing (self-reducing) at
¡
Y t−11 , F
t−1¢
if ΠL
¡
Y t−11 + 1, F
t−1 − 1
¢
− ΠL
¡
Y t−11 , F
t−1¢ > (<) ΠL ¡Y t−11 , F t−1¢−
ΠL
¡
Y t−11 − 1, F t−1 + 1
¢
.
Acquisition externalities are thus positive if the benefits for a small firm
from the elimination of one small competitor outweigh the losses from facing a
larger competitor. As acquisition costs depend on small firm profits, positive
acquisition externalities and increasing acquisition costs are closely related.
Acquisition incentives are self-reinforcing if an acquisition makes a future
acquisition more valuable. The following conditions help to detect whether
acquisition incentives are self-reinforcing or -reducing.15
Lemma 1 Acquisition incentives are self-reinforcing if ΠLY1Y1 ≥ 0,Π
L
Y1F
≤ 0
and ΠLFF ≥ 0 and self-reducing if ΠLY1Y1 ≤ 0,Π
L
Y1F
≥ 0 and ΠLFF ≤ 0.
Proof. Appendix A
To understand the conditions in lemma 1, represent product market prof-
its ΠL (Y1, F ) as the product of equilibrium demand for the large firm,
DL (Y1, F ) and the price-unit cost diﬀerence (mark-up) ML (Y1, F ) so that
ΠL (Y1, F ) = DL (Y1, F ) ·M (Y1, F ). Clearly, ΠLFF = 2DLF ·MLF +DLFF ·ML+
DL ·MLFF . Under the natural assumption that DLF < 0 and MLF < 0, the
first term on the right-hand side is positive, reflecting a complementarity
between demand and mark-up (a higher mark-up is more valuable for higher
demand). The remaining terms might be negative, but in many cases the
complementarity dominates, so that ΠLFF ≥ 0. Similar arguments apply to
the conditions ΠLY1Y1 ≥ 0 and Π
L
Y1F
≤ 0.
We now give conditions under which monopolization arises for arbitrary
initial values.
15As usual subscripts stand for partial derivatives.
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Proposition 2 Suppose there are negative acquisition externalities, decreas-
ing acquisition costs and self-reinforcing acquisition incentives for some Y 01 ,
F 01 . Then if the myopic game has a strong concentration equilibrium in period
1, this will also be true in all future periods until monopolization arises.
Proof. Appendix B
The conditions in proposition 2 rarely hold for arbitrary initial values.
Specifically, many oligopoly models display positive acquisition externalities
and thus increasing acquisition costs: This is a source of limits to concentra-
tion.
4.2 Forward-Looking Firms
As a full analysis of forward-looking firms is rather tedious, we restrict our-
selves to two-period games. We show how the existence of a strong concen-
tration equilibrium in the repeated myopic game relates to the existence of a
subgame perfect equilibrium with increasing concentration in the two-period
version of the game.
We distinguish between first- and second-period acquisition costs. Acqui-
sition costs in the second period are the same as in the myopic, one-period
game. Acquisition costs in period 1 should be higher, as a firm that is ac-
quired foregoes profits for two periods. In addition, they should diﬀer accord-
ing to whether entry takes place in period 1 or not, just as the corresponding
small firm profits do. In the former case we write AC1, otherwise AC0, in
both cases we speak of long-term acquisition costs.
Proposition 3 Suppose parameters are such that every second-period sub-
game has a strong concentration equilibrium. Suppose that
ΠS (Y 01 + 1, F
0)+ΠS (Y 01 + 2, F
0 − 1) ≤ E and AC0 ≤ 2AC (Y 01 + 1, F 0 − 1).
Then, concentration increases in both periods in any SPE.
Proof. Appendix C
Intuitively, ”no entry” requires that the expected profits over both periods
are smaller than the entry costs, which corresponds to the first inequality.
Compared to the myopic case, acquisitions today have the additional benefit
11
that they will allow a higher product market profit tomorrow. If, as required
by the second inequality, long-term acquisition costs are not higher than
short-term acquisition costs, the acquisition condition is thus easier to fulfill
for a concentration equilibrium in period 1 with forward-looking firms. Thus,
qualitatively, the conditions leading to increasing concentration in the myopic
case are not misleading.
Note that the reinforcement of acquisition incentives discussed above is
not the result of strategic eﬀects, as for the parameters under considera-
tion there is no second-period entry anyway. Strategic eﬀects arise when
acquisitions in period 1 influence entry incentives in period 2. The following
terminology is helpful.
Definition 2
An acquisition is entry-deterring if
ΠS
¡
Y 01 + 1, F
0 + a1e1
¢
> E > ΠS
¡
Y 01 + 2, F
0 − 1 + a1e1
¢
for a1e1 ∈ {0, 1}.
(2) An acquisition is entry-triggering if
ΠS
¡
Y 01 + 1, F
0 + a1e1
¢
< E < ΠS
¡
Y 01 + 2, F
0 − 1 + a1e1
¢
for a1e1 ∈ {0, 1}.
Thus, if an acquisition is entry-deterring, entry becomes undesirable for
the entrant in the following period when the large incumbent acquires a small
firm in the preceding period of the game. An analogous interpretation applies
for entry-triggering acquisitions.16 By (A3), entry always has a negative eﬀect
on the large incumbent’s profits. Thus, the large firm will have a strategic
incentive to avoid entry, as summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose acquisition is entry-deterring. Suppose that param-
eters are such that the large incumbent invests in every second-period sub-
game. Finally, assume that a1e1 = 0. Then the strategic incentive to invest is
ΠS (Y 01 + 1, F
0 − 1)−ΠS (Y 01 + 1, F 0)+AC (Y 01 + 1, F 0)−AC (Y 01 + 1, F 0 − 1) .
Proof. Appendix D.
16Note that negative acquisition externalities are necessary for entry-deterring acquisi-
tions and positive acquisition externalities are necessary for entry-triggering acquisitions.
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The large incumbent therefore tends to ”overinvest” in the case of entry
deterring acquisitions. Similarly, it can be shown that he tends to ”underin-
vest” in the case of entry triggering acquisitions.17
5 Examples
We now discuss the implications of Propositions 1 and 2 for two examples.
First, we consider cost-reducing acquisitions in a linear Cournot example.
Second, we consider ”mergers for variety”, where acquisition increases the
product spectrum of a firm.
In both examples, we assume that acquisition costs amount to
AC
¡
Y t−11 + 1, F
t−1 − 1
¢
= min
©
ΠS
¡
Y t−11 , F
t−1¢ ,ΠS ¡Y t−11 + 1, F t−1 − 1¢ª .
(1)
We refrain from including a detailed game-theoretic derivation of this spec-
ification,18 but the intuition is straightforward. Competition between small
firms drives down takeover prices to their outside options. These outside op-
tions depend on whether some competitor is taken over (in which case profits
are ΠS
¡
Y t−11 + 1, F
t−1 − 1
¢
) or not (in which case they are ΠS (Y t1 , F
t−1)).
We sketch the case ΠS
¡
Y t−11 + 1, F
t−1 − 1
¢
≥ ΠS (Y t1 , F t−1), i.e, positive ac-
quisition externalities, in slightly more detail.
Suppose the large firm states a maximum price r that it is prepared
to pay for a small firm. Suppose all small firms then simultaneously state
a price at which they are prepared to be taken over, and the firm stating
the lowest price (≤ r) is taken over. The large firm will set r as low as
possible. Clearly, it must demand at least ΠS (Y t1 , F
t−1) for any small firm
17Thus, in the Fudenberg, Tirole (1984) terminology he plays ”Top Dog” in the former
case, ”Lean and Hungry” in the latter case. However, there is a potential counter-eﬀect.
Take, for instance, the case with overinvestment. Deviating from investment in period 1
leads to one more competitor in period 2 because of the entry-deterring nature of acquisi-
tions and, thus, to lower product market profits for the large incumbent. Hence, incentives
to overinvest arise. On the other hand, however, with one more competitor, the costs of a
possible second period acquisition are lower, and this eﬀect reduces the strategic incentive
to overinvest.
18A full derivation of (1) as the outcome of a takeover game is available from the authors
on request.
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to be prepared to sell. If it sets r = ΠS (Y t1 , F
t−1), there are chicken-type
multiple equilibria, with one firm demanding a selling price of ΠS (Y t1 , F
t−1)
and the others demanding more: Because of positive acquisition externalities,
small firms want a takeover to take place, but prefer others to be taken
over. Thus, if one accepts the idea that small firms coordinate on one of the
asymmetric equilibria, then ΠS (Y t1 , F
t−1) is a natural acquisition cost.19
5.1 The Synergy Game
We specify the set-up of section 2 as follows. Firms compete in a homogenous-
good industry. Inverse demand is given by p = α−βX, where p is the price,X
is the total quantity sold in the industry and α and β are demand parameters.
Firm i has the cost function Ci = xi/Y
γ
i , where xi is the quantity produced
by firm i and γ > 0 is a synergy parameter. Thus, the large incumbent has
lower marginal costs than the small incumbents, whose marginal costs are
normalized to 1. These synergies are, however, decreasing in the number of
firms already acquired.
In this synergy game, calculation of equilibrium product market profits
reveals the following properties. The equilibrium profits do not satisfy all of
the suﬃcient conditions for monopolization in proposition 2 (a). As in the
standard linear homogeneous Cournot model, acquisitions have positive ex-
ternalities on small firms’ profits even though we allow for synergies,20 which,
in addition, results in increasing acquisition costs. The large incumbent’s ac-
quisition incentives are still self-reinforcing in spite of declining synergies
from mergers, mainly because of the market structure eﬀect on the large
firm’s profits. Acquisition gains rise substantially through the elimination
of a competitor when the firm number in the market becomes small. This
property of the large firm’s profit function dominates the declining synergies
from mergers.
19An alternative view would be that mixed strategy equilibria are played, which would
tend to increase the acquisition price.
20This property is not general; acquisition externalities eventually become negative, for
instance, as entry costs decrease substantially. With very low entry costs, potentially
many small firms compete in the market and the positive eﬀect of an acquisition through
a decrease in the firm number virtually becomes negligible.
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Insertion of the product market profits into proposition 1 and the anal-
ogous expressions for the alternative equilibria yields conditions for all con-
ceivable equilibria. For α = 5, β = γ = 1 and E = 0.75, Figure 1 describes the
combinations of Y t−11 and F
t−1 for which each type of equilibrium emerges
in the static game. The lines in the figure correspond to the boundaries of
the (no-)entry conditions ENT1 and the acquisition conditions ACQ0 from
proposition 1.
< Figure 1 about here >
First, note that, by (A3), entry becomes harder when there are many
firms in the market and/or when the large incumbent has a high state, that
is, low marginal costs, which explains the declining line ENT1.
More interestingly, the acquisition condition is non-monotone in the num-
ber of small firms. To understand this, recall that an acquisition of a small
incumbent by the large incumbent is more profitable the higher OSE and
MSE and the lower AC. In general, changes in F t−1 do not influence OSE,
MSE and AC in the same fashion. Concerning OSE, the cost reduction
following a merger is independent of the number of other firms in the mar-
ket. The eﬀect that any given cost reduction has on profits usually is higher
the lower the number of other firms in the market: with a lower number
of competitors, the own output level will be higher, making cost-reductions
more valuable. Thus, OSE should be decreasing in F t−1. The same is true
for MSE. Intuitively, positive price eﬀects from eliminating competition are
higher when the firm already has a high market share. Finally, acquisition
costs fall as the number of small firms grows. To sum up, OSE, MSE and
AC are all decreasing in the number of firms. The non-monotonicity in our
example may thus be explained as follows. Starting from low firm numbers,
the decreasing own state eﬀect and the decreasing market structure eﬀect
dominate over decreasing acquisition costs, and mergers become less prof-
itable as the firm number increases. As F t−1 increases further, the eﬀect of
decreasing acquisition costs eventually dominates over the market structure
eﬀect and the own state eﬀect, so that acquisitions become more likely.
In Figure 1, an increase in Y t−11 unambiguously makes the acquisition
condition harder to satisfy. This reflects decreasing synergies which reduce
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OSE. However, there are also countervailing eﬀects. First, any given cost
reduction is more valuable the higher the market share. Second, decreasing
acquisition costs also have to be taken into account. Therefore, for alternative
specifications (for instance, non-decreasing synergies) the impact of Y t−11 on
acquisition incentives may be reversed.
In this example, three pure strategy equilibria can arise: the strong
concentration equilibrium (1, 0), the weak concentration equilibrium (1, 1),
where both players of the game invest and the stationary equilibrium (0, 0)
where no player invests. Figure 1 also reveals that the myopic game displays
diﬀerences in long-term behavior depending on the initial value of the large
firm’s size and the initial number of firms in the market. When there are
not many small firms initially (as in point A), monopolization will eventu-
ally arise, since the system moves one unit down and one unit to the right
whenever there is a strong concentration equilibrium. Thus, even though
synergies are declining and acquisition costs are rising, this model is able
to generate a pattern of myopic market dynamics where firm asymmetries
become increasingly pronounced. When there are many small firms initially,
however, (as in point B), the concentration process may come to a halt long
before monopolization, as the system reaches the stationary equilibrium re-
gion where it remains forever. This result has interesting implications. It
would for instance suggest that a newly privatized industry with a large
incumbent and a small fringe may never develop towards a competitive mar-
ket, whereas an otherwise identical industry may have a chance to retain a
relatively competitive market structure when it starts out competitively.21
The eﬀects of changes in other parameters are briefly summarized with-
out figures. Consider the demand parameter α and the synergy parameter
γ. Entry becomes less likely as α decreases and γ increases. Acquisition con-
ditions are also easier to fulfill as γ increases. Less obviously, a decrease in α
makes acquisitions more likely. This mainly reflects the eﬀects of decreasing
21We should, however, be cautious in interpreting the myopic dynamics of the synergy
game. The result of increasing dominance when starting at point A may be an artefact of
the simplifying assumption that only one firm is able to carry out acquisition. Otherwise,
countervailing eﬀects may arise. The reason is that, with declining synergies, smaller
firms should also have higher acquisiton incentives than large firms, leading to a tendency
towards declining asymmetries between firms (see section 6).
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acquisition costs.
5.2 Merging for Variety
Often, firms use mergers and acquisitions to expand into related markets.
Accordingly, we now interpret a firm’s state variable as the number of product
varieties it sells. Thus, each small firm sells one variety; a large firm sells
Y t1 varieties. Π
L (Y t1 , F
t) is the profit of a large firm that sells Y t1 varieties
when there are F t small firms in the market. ΠS (Y t1 , F
t) is the profit of a
small firm facing a large firm which sells Y t1 varieties and F
t − 1 other small
firms, each of which sells one variety. We introduce the additional notation
πL (Y t1 , V
t) = ΠL (Y t1 , V
t − Y t1 ) /Y t1 for the profit of a large firm per variety
sold, when its state is Y t1 and the total number of varieties is V
t = Y t1 + F
t.
We thus write πS (Y t1 , V
t) = ΠS (Y t1 , V
t − Y t1 ) for the profits of a small firm
when V t varieties are sold and the large competitor sells Y t1 varieties.
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Now consider the inverse demand function pl = a− bxl − c
P
k 6=l xk with
a, b, c > 0 and b > c. Firms compete in prices.23 For the following illustration,
we set a = 5, b = 1,c = 0.75 and E = 0.15. Figure 2 summarizes the
equilibria. Note that the figure is only meaningful for Y t−11 ≤ V t−1, the
region bounded below by the bold line. There are some important diﬀerences
with respect to the synergy example.
< Figure 2 about here >
First, market entry becomes more likely as the large incumbent becomes
larger. This reflects positive acquisition externalities: large firms price less
aggressively to avoid cannibalizing demand on its other varieties. Second, the
higher V t−1 and the lower Y t−11 , the larger the incentive for a firm to acquire
22Implicit in this set-up is the symmetry assumption that each small firm earns the same
profit and that the large firm earns the same profit for each variety.
23For price competition, it would seem more natural to consider demand functions xl =
A − B + C
P
k 6=l
pk rather than inverse demand. However, this would for instance imply
that the maximal demand per variety is independent of the number of varieties. Our
demand system corresponds to a demand function xl = A (V ) − B (V ) + C (V )
P
k=l pk
with A0 < 0, B0 > 0, C0 < 0, which seems more plausible.
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a small competitor in order to enlarge the range of varieties it produces.24
To understand this, consider the eﬀect of increasing Y t−11 . As Y
t−1
1 increases,
acquisition costs rise, which makes acquisitions less attractive. However, the
additional variety becomes more valuable, as πL
¡
Y t−11 + 1, V
t−1¢ increases
in Y t−11 . Furthermore, the profit increase per variety,
¡
πL
¡
Y t−11 + 1, V
t−1¢—
πL
¡
Y t−11 , V
t−1¢¢, is larger if the large firm already sells more varieties. The
eﬀect of increasing V t−1 reflects decreasing acquisition costs. However, there
are also opposing eﬀects. For instance, as V t−1 increases, πL
¡
Y t−11 + 1, V
t−1¢
falls, which makes acquisitions less attractive.
The resulting equilibrium behavior is much simpler than in the synergy
example: Only the strong and the weak concentration equilibria are possible.
Unsurprisingly, the strong concentration equilibrium is more likely when the
total number of varieties is large and the size of the large firm relatively
small, as entry becomes less attractive. More interestingly, acquisitions are
worthwhile for arbitrary initial conditions. Thus, the positive eﬀects from
acquisitions are always greater than the acquisition costs, i.e., small firm
profits. Intuitively, large firm acquisition benefits consist of the profits from
selling one more variety, and the increased profits on the other varieties.
The second eﬀect introduces a wedge between small firm profits, that is,
acquisition costs, and large firm acquisition benefits which is why acquisitions
are so attractive in this context.
The resulting myopic dynamics are thus extremely simple. In the long
run, the system always ”moves to the north-east”, that is, there is continuous
entry with simultaneous acquisitions by the large firm.25 Initial values matter
only because, with a large initial number of small firms, there will be no
entry until the large firm has reached a critical size. To sum up, merging
for variety leads to increasing market concentration even though acquisition
externalities are positive and, thus, acquisition costs are rising. However,
24Note that the acquisition condition (ACQ1) always holds since the corresponding line
lies below the bold line.
25This result might appear to contradict Sutton’s (1998) general result that markets
with a certain degree of product diﬀerentiation reveal low concentration levels. However,
in his model the firm number is fixed. Further, firms are not involved in acquisition and
market entry decisions, respectively, but in the choice of quality levels for each of their
varieties.
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market monopolization never occurs because market entry becomes more
and more valuable when the large firm grows steadily.
We briefly report the eﬀects of two other parameters without giving fig-
ures. An increase in market size a makes entry more likely. Also, it turns
out that market size increases leave the acquisition condition unaﬀected, so
that the strong concentration equilibrium becomes less likely.26 An increase
in substitutability c decreases entry incentives and increases acquisition in-
centives, so the strong concentration equilibrium becomes more likely. Both
observations are consistent with the notion that increasing intensity of com-
petition, that is, lower small firm profits and thus lower acquisition costs,
increases the chances for a strong concentration equilibrium.
5.3 Real World Examples
We briefly sketch how the four examples given in the introduction can be
interpreted in the light of our framework. First, the beer industry nicely
fits the merger for variety case: The vertically integrated breweries acquired
others because this gave them the possibility to sell other product varieties,
that is, beer in other local markets. Additionally, due to the limited number
of beer sales licenses entry cost were very high, corresponding to low no-
entry condition ENT1. The reported increase in concentration is thus what
we should expect.
The stationary equilibrium in the corporate law case does not exactly fit
either of the two examples. Within the more general model of sections 2 to
4, it still makes sense, however. Informal accounts of the industry suggest
that the quality of services provided tends to suﬀer from excessive firm size
(Economist, 2000). With quality as the state variable, own state eﬀects are
thus small or even negative. Combined with high entry costs, this results in
a stationary equilibrium.
The PC example is also broadly consistent with the more general model.
As the ”clone”-terminology suggests, the issue of variety is not substantial in
this case. The scope for cost-cutting or quality enhancement by acquisition
26This is a result of the linear specification.
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also appears to be limited. On the other hand, high demand and low entry
costs make entry attractive.27
Trying to explain the airline example clearly shows some limitations of our
approach. Though much of the real world story seems to be about product
variety, asymmetries between varieties play an essential role, contrary to our
assumptions. The simultaneous entry and acquisition in this industry relies
on the simultaneous existence of high and low quality services. New firms
enter, oﬀering cheap low-quality services, whereas acquisitions concern only
higher quality services. Apparently this pattern can obtain because the large
airlines cannot simply copy the low-cost technology of the entrants, because
such a behavior would have adverse eﬀects on their other lines (because of
reputational eﬀects for instance). Market dynamics are thus driven by verti-
cal quality diﬀerences that are not accounted for by our model. The software
and toy industry broadly fit our variety model: According to Pesendorfer
(2002), there is a continuous flow of entrants which are often rapidly bought
up by the market leaders. The equilibrium is thus of the (1,1) type.
6 The Multi-Player Investment Game
We now allow more than one firm to take over small firms and more than one
firm to enter. More precisely, we replace (A5) with the following assumption.
(A5)’ At the beginning of each period t, the set of all firms is divided into
At−1 ≥ 1 acquirors of size ≥ 1, Bt−1 ≥ 1 potential entrants and St−1
small firms that are not allowed to invest.
Apart from dispensing with the restriction At−1 = Bt−1 = 1, we thus
also allow some small firms to acquire other small firms. One unsatisfactory
feature of (A5) that carries over to (A5)’ is the artificial division between
potential investors and potential acquirees. Without this distinction, the
model would become extremely complex. Even in our simplified setting,
an exact calculation of diﬀerent equilibria for arbitrary parameter values is
27The fact that some entrants, such as Dell, provided additional innovations enhanced
the process, but is not strictly speaking necessary.
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cumbersome. However, at least for the myopic case, we can sidestep such
problems by applying theorem 1 in Athey and Schmutzler (2001) to give
suﬃcient conditions under which large firms always invest at least as much
as small firms in equilibrium.
To apply this result, it is convenient to write net equilibrium payoﬀs (prof-
its minus investment costs) in the oligopoly game at the end of period t as a
functionYt−1 and at rather than as a function ofYt and Ft. Suppose w.l.o.g.
that active firms in period t are ordered so that the first I t−1 = At−1 +Bt−1
firms are potential investors, and firms I t−1 + 1, ..., N t−1 are non-investors.
Let Zt−1i ≡ Y t−1i for all i ∈ 1, ..., I t−1. Let Zt−1 =
¡
Zt−11 , ...,Z
t−1
It−1
¢
be the
vector of states of all potential investors. Let at ≡
¡
at1, ..., a
t
It−1
¢
be the
vector of investment decisions. Define nA (Z
t−1, at) as the number of acqui-
sitions in period t and nE (Z
t−1,at) as the number of entrants. By (A1)
and (A2), product market profits for any investor i are fully determined by
Zt = Zt−1 + at and St (Zt−1, at,St−1) = St−1 − nA (Zt−1, at) + nE (Zt−1, at).
Thus write bΠi(Zt, St (Zt−1, at,St−1)) for firm i’s product market profits. Sim-
ilarly, we write AC (Zt−1 + at,St−1) for acquisition costs. We introduce the
following variant of (A6).
(A6)’ AC is decreasing in Zt and St.
Define
ki
¡
Zt−1,at,St−1
¢
=
(
E, if Zt−1i = 0
AC (Zt−1 + at, St (Zt−1, at,St−1)) , if Zt−1i > 0
.
Then net profits can be written as
πi
¡
Zt−1,at,St−1
¢
= bΠi(Zt−1 + at, St ¡Zt−1,at,St−1¢)− ki ¡Zt−1,at,St−1¢ .
Our goal is to give conditions such that, for any given St−1, Zt−1k ≥ Zt−1l
implies atk ≥ atl . To see this, consider the following condition.
Definition 3 Product market profits satisfy markup-demand complementar-
ity (MDC) if bΠiZiZi > 0; bΠiZiS < 0; bΠiSS > 0; bΠiZiZj < 0; bΠiZjS > 0.
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To simplify language, when we speak of negative (positive) acquisition
externalities we shall take this to also include that acquisition costs are de-
creasing (increasing). We obtain the following result.
Proposition 5 Suppose (A1)−(A4), (A5)0, (A6)0 and (MDC) hold. Suppose
further that
(1) ∂
bΠi
∂Zi and | ∂
bΠi
∂S | are suﬃciently large for Zi ≥ 1.
(2) bΠi is small for Zi = 1; Acquisition costs are small.
(3) Acquisition externalities are non-positive, but not very negative.
Then Zk ≥ Zl implies ak ≥ al.
Proposition 5 gives a set of suﬃcient conditions for (weakly) increasing
concentration in a set-up with multiple investors. Conditions (1) and (2)
essentially restate the idea from section 3 that, with a large OSE, MSE and
with tough competition, acquisitions are more likely to take place than entry.
Condition (MDC ) and (3) make sure that the larger a firm, the more likely
it is to acquire small firms. Condition (MDC ) is satisfied in many oligopoly
models, condition (3) only holds in intermediate parameter regimes.
Proposition 5 uses theorem 1 in Athey and Schmutzler (2001), which
implies the following result in our setting:
Lemma 2 Suppose (A1)− (A4), (A5)0 and (A6)0 hold. Suppose further
(i) πi has increasing diﬀerences in
¡
Zt−1i , a
t
i
¢
.28
(ii) πi has decreasing diﬀerences in
¡
Zt−1j , a
t
i
¢
for j 6= i.
(iii) The players’ actions are strategic substitutes in πi.
Then Zt−1k ≥ Zt−1l implies at−1k ≥ at−1l .
The intuition for this lemma is straightforward for two active firms. The
direct eﬀect of having a high state on a firm is having a high return on
investment by (i). The direct eﬀect on the competitor is that he has a low
return by (ii). By (iii), these eﬀects reinforce each other.
In Appendix E, we prove proposition 5 by showing that the conditions
of the theorem imply the three conditions of the lemma. The proof also
28That is, πi
¡
Zt−1i , 1,S
t−1¢− πi ¡Zt−1i , 0,St−1¢ is increasing in Zt−1i .
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clarifies the precise meaning of ”suﬃciently large” and ”small” in conditions
(1) and (2) of the proposition 5. To see that the three conditions hold, we
need to consider several cases, depending on whether the investment is entry
or an acquisition. In the terminology of section 3, (i) requires that NIE is
increasing in the state of the investor. In particular, to show that NIE is
at least as big as for Zt−1i > 0 than for Z
t−1
i = 0, we need to show that
NAE ≥ NEE. Conditions (1) and (2) of the theorem guarantee this result.
To show that NIE is increasing in Zt−1i for Z
t−1
i ≥ 1, we need to make sure
that NAE increases with the own state. (MDC ) is helpful to obtain this,
as it implies that, after an increase in the own state, both the benefit from
a further increase in the state and from the elimination of a competitor are
higher. The result then follows as AC is decreasing in the own state.
(ii) requires that NIE is decreasing in Zt−1j . For NEE, that is, for
Zt−1i = 0 this follows trivially from (A3). For NAE,
bΠiZiZj < 0 and bΠiSZj > 0
make sure that product market profits from an acquisition increase more
when facing a competitor with a low-state Zj . Given negative acquisition
externalities, however, acquisition costs are higher with a low-state competi-
tor, as small firms’ product market profits are. Thus, a countervailing force
to increasing concentration might arise. If acquisition externalities are suﬃ-
ciently low, however, this eﬀect is dominated.
(iii) requires that NIE decreases if a competitor invests. It consists of
four subconditions, depending on whether the investment variables of each of
the two firms considered correspond to entry or acquisition. It follows from
negative acquisition externalities if ai is entry and aj is an acquisition. If ai
and aj are entry variables, strategic substitutability follows by (A3). If ai is
an acquisition, one has to resort to (MDC ): bΠiZiZj < 0,bΠiZiS < 0, bΠiZjS > 0
and bΠiSS > 0 imply that the profit increase from an acquisition is higher
when some potential entrant does not enter. Again, unless acquisition costs
are suﬃciently small, they may yield a countervailing eﬀect, as they are lower
when entry takes place. To make sure that an acquisition is more valuable
when some competitor does not carry out an acquisition, similar arguments
are required.
We do not explicitly consider forward-looking firms in this section. In-
tuitively, it is clear that strategic considerations would arise that are not
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present in section 4.2. Large firms would not only consider the strategic ef-
fects of their acquisition decisions on future entry, but also on competitors’
acquisition decisions. If acquisitions by competitors are desired, the strategic
incentive would depend on whether acquisitions make future acquisitions by
competitors more likely, and correspondingly, if acquisitions are not desired.29
7 Conclusions and Extensions
This paper has used an extremely simple framework to discuss under which
circumstances concentration increases in a market with entry and acquisi-
tions. The first set of results was developed in a static model: stated suc-
cinctly, these results show that increasing concentration is more likely for
tough competition.
The next set of results concerns myopic dynamics. We provided a set of
suﬃcient conditions for increasing concentration to increase the likelihood of
future concentration: self-reinforcing acquisition incentives, negative acqui-
sition externalities and decreasing acquisition costs. While self-reinforcing
acquisition incentives often hold, the latter two conditions are less likely, as
they require fairly strong synergies. When synergies are not strong, concen-
tration processes often come to a halt before monopolization.
With forward-looking firms, the conditions favoring concentration in a
static world are also relevant, but require modification. Strategic incentives
reinforce concentration tendencies when acquisition externalities are negative
and reduce them when they are positive.
For a linear Cournot model where mergers result in cost-reducing syner-
gies, we show that a smaller market, a higher synergy parameter and higher
entry costs increase concentration. The number of small firms usually and
the initial size of the large firm generally have ambiguous eﬀects, depending
on the specification of synergies. Myopic dynamics are fairly complex as a
result - with the chances of monopolization depending on initial conditions.
An example of price competition with mergers as expansions into related
29Nilssen and Sørgard (1999) consider related issues in a simple model with mergers,
but without entry.
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markets diﬀers strongly in that it has a built-in force towards concentration.
Acquisitions have the positive eﬀect that the acquiring firm can increase
prices on the acquired variety so as to increase profits on its old product
varieties. While the price increases generate positive acquisition external-
ities, acquisition incentives are so strong that acquisitions always arise in
equilibrium. Myopic dynamics thus also imply increasing concentration.
One possible extension of the paper concerns internal investments. What
would happen if cost-reductions or expansions in the product spectrum could
also be achieved by internal investments? Would the same factors foster con-
centration? In addition, the analysis should be supplemented by managerial
considerations. There are many empirical studies about the eﬀects of merg-
ers on the profits of the firms involved. While no consensus has emerged so
far, acquisitions are certainly not seen to be profit-increasing in general.30
Though there is no obvious reason why the qualitative insights of this pa-
per should not survive as long as managerial utility is at least positively
correlated with firm profits, this should be checked.
30For conflicting views on this subject, see Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989) and Healy
et al. (1992).
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Appendices
A Proof of Lemma 1
Using ΠLY1Y1 ≥ 0,Π
L
Y1F
≤ 0,ΠLFF ≥ 0,
ΠL
¡
Y t−11 + 1, F
t−1 − 1
¢
−ΠL
¡
Y t−11 , F
t−1¢ =
ΠL
¡
Y t−11 + 1, F
t−1 − 1
¢
− ΠL
¡
Y t−11 , F
t−1 − 1
¢
+ΠL
¡
Y t−11 , F
t−1 − 1
¢
− ΠL
¡
Y t−11 , F
t−1¢ =Z Y t−11 +1
Y t−11
ΠLY1
¡
Y1, F
t−1 − 1
¢
dY1 −
Z F t−1
F t−1−1
ΠLF
¡
Y t−11 , F
¢
dF ≥Z Y t−11 +1
Y t−11
ΠLY1
¡
Y t−11 − 1, F t−1 − 1
¢
dY1 −
Z F t−1
F t−1−1
ΠLF
¡
Y t−11 , F
¢
dF =Z Y t−11
Y t−11 −1
ΠLY1
¡
Y1, F
t−1 − 1
¢
dY1 −
Z F t−1
F t−1−1
ΠLF
¡
Y t−11 , F
¢
dF ≥Z Y t−11
Y t−11 −1
ΠLY1
¡
Y1, F
t−1¢ dY1 − Z F t−1+1
F t−1
ΠLF
¡
Y t−11 − 1, F
¢
dF =
ΠL
¡
Y t−11 , F
t−1¢− ΠL ¡Y t−11 − 1, F t−1¢
+ΠL
¡
Y t−11 − 1, F t−1
¢
− ΠL
¡
Y t−11 − 1, F t−1 + 1
¢
=
ΠL
¡
Y t−11 , F
t−1¢− ΠL ¡Y t−11 − 1, F t−1 + 1¢ .
B Proof of Proposition 2
If there is a strong concentration equilibrium in any period and there are
negative acquisition externalities, small firm profits are smaller in the next
period, so that (ENT1) in period t− 1 implies (ENT1) in period t, and sim-
ilarly for (ENT0). Also, as acquisition costs are decreasing and acquisition
incentives increasing, if (ACQ0) holds at the end of period t − 1 and (1, 0)
is played during period t, (ACQ0) holds at the end of period t.
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C Proof of Proposition 3
By assumption, every second-period subgame has a strong concentration
equilibrium. Therefore, the first-period payoﬀ matrix is as described in Table
2.
< Table 2 about here >
Since (ACQ0) holds in any second period subgame
ΠL
¡
Y 01 + 1, F
0 − 1
¢
− ΠL
¡
Y 01 , F
0
¢
≥ AC
¡
Y 01 + 1, F
0 − 1
¢
and
ΠL
¡
Y 01 + 2, F
0 − 2
¢
−ΠL
¡
Y 01 + 1, F
0 − 1
¢
≥ AC
¡
Y 01 + 2, F
0 − 2
¢
.
Summing up these inequalities, we have
ΠL
¡
Y 01 + 2, F
0 − 2
¢
−ΠL
¡
Y 01 , F
0
¢
− AC
¡
Y 01 + 1, F
0 − 1
¢
−AC
¡
Y 01 + 2, F
0 − 2
¢
≥ 0.
AC0 ≤ 2AC (Y 01 + 1, F 0 − 1) implies
ΠL
¡
Y 01 + 2, F
0 − 2
¢
−ΠL
¡
Y 01 , F
0
¢
− AC0 − AC
¡
Y 01 + 2, F
0 − 2
¢
+
AC
¡
Y 01 + 1, F
0 − 1
¢
≥ 0.
Thus, it is not profitable for firm 1 to deviate from the equilibrium strategy.
For firm e0, deviations are not profitable by assumption.
D Proof of Proposition 4
We proceed as in the proof of proposition 3. By entry-deterrence and by the
assumption that a21 = 1, the weak concentration equilibrium (1,1) is played
in subgames (00) and (01), and the strong concentration equilibrium (1,0)
is played in subgames (10) and (11). The large firm’s total equilibrium pay-
oﬀ when investing in period 1 (and entry is absent) is ΠL (Y 01 + 1, F
0 − 1) +
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ΠL (Y 01 + 2, F
0 − 2)−AC0−AC (Y 01 + 2, F 0 − 2). Deviating to non-investment
in period 1 would provoke second-period entry and yield payoﬀs ΠL (Y 0, F 0)+
ΠL (Y 0 + 1, F 0)−AC (Y 01 + 1, F 0). After suitable additions of zero, the dif-
ference can thus be written as
ΠL
¡
Y 01 + 2, F
0 − 2
¢
−ΠL
¡
Y 01 + 1, F
0 − 1
¢
−AC
¡
Y 01 + 2, F
0 − 2
¢
+AC
¡
Y 01 + 1, F
0 − 1
¢
+ΠL
¡
Y 01 + 1, F
0 − 1
¢
− ΠL
¡
Y 01 , F
0
¢
− AC0
+ΠL
¡
Y 01 + 1, F
0 − 1
¢
−ΠL
¡
Y 01 + 1, F
0
¢
+AC
¡
Y 01 + 1, F
0
¢
−AC
¡
Y 01 + 1, F
0 − 1
¢
,
where the first two lines describe the direct acquisition eﬀect on the large
firm’s profit in period 2 and 1, and the third line describe the strategic eﬀect.
By assumption (A3) the diﬀerence between the product market profits in the
last line are positive, the diﬀerence between the acquisition costs are negative.
E Proof of Proposition 5
We show that the conditions in lemma 2 hold if the conditions in the theorem
do. We address each condition in turn. For simplicity of notation, we shall
only consider investing firms with indices 1 and 2.
(i) π1 has increasing diﬀerences in
¡
Zt−11 , a
t
1
¢
.
We have to distinguish between acquisition (ia) and entry (ib) decisions.
(ia) Acquisitions are more profitable for firm i the higher its size:bΠ1 £¡Zt−11 + 1, Zt2¢ , St−1 − 1¤− bΠ1 £¡Zt−11 , Zt2¢ , St−1¤−
AC
£¡
Zt−11 + 1, Z
t
2
¢
, St−1 − 1
¤
≥ bΠ1 £¡Zt−11 , Zt2¢ , St−1 − 1¤−bΠ1 £¡Zt−11 − 1, Zt2¢ , St−1¤− AC £¡Zt−11 , Zt2¢ , St−1 − 1¤.
This follows from bΠ1Z1Z1 > 0, bΠ1Z1S < 0 and the fact that AC is decreas-
ing in Z1.
(ib) Acquisitions are more profitable than entry: By condition (1) and (2)
of the theorem,bΠ1 £¡Zt−11 + 1, Zt2, ¢St−1 − 1¤− bΠ1 £¡Zt−11 , Zt2¢ , St−1¤
−AC
£¡
Zt−11 + 1, Z
t
2
¢
, St−1 − 1
¤
≥ bΠ1 [(1, Zt2) , St−1 + 1]− E.
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(ii) π1 has decreasing diﬀerences in (Zt2, a
t
1).
(iia) Entry is more valuable if some other investor has a lower state.bΠ1 [(1, Zt2) , St−1 + 1] is decreasing in Zt2. This follows immediately from
(A3).
(iib) If at1 corresponds to an acquisition, (ii) corresponds to the requirement
thatbΠ1 £¡Zt−11 + 1, Zt2¢ , St − 1¤−bΠ1 £¡Zt−11 , Zt2¢ , St¤−AC £¡Zt−11 + 1, Zt2¢ , St − 1¤
be decreasing in Zt2. For suﬃciently low acquisition externalities, the
result follows from Π1ZiZj < 0;Π
1
ZjS
> 0.
(iii) Actions are strategic substitutes.
This condition requires that π1 (Zt−1, (1, at2) , S
t−1)−π1 (Zt−1, (0, at2) , St−1)
is weakly decreasing in at2. Depending on whether Z
t−1
1 and Z
t−1
2 are
positive or zero, that is, whether at1 and a
t
2 correspond to an acquisition
or an entry decision, (iii) thus has four sub-conditions.
(iiia) Entry of firm 1 must be more profitable if firm 2 does not enter, i.e.,bΠ1 ((1, 0) , St) ≥ bΠ1 ((1, 1) , St + 1). This condition follows trivially
from (A3).
(iiib) Entry of firm 1 is more profitable if firm 2 does not acquire some
competitor. Thus, bΠ1 £¡1, Zt−12 ¢ , St¤ ≥ bΠ1 £¡1, Zt−12 + 1¢ , St − 1¤ for
Zt−11 ≥ 1. This condition clearly holds if there are non-positive acqui-
sition externalities.
(iiic) An acquisition by firm 1 is more valuable when firm 2 does not enter.bΠ1 £¡Zt−11 + 1, 0¢ , St − 1¤−bΠ1 £¡Zt−11 , 0¢ , St¤−AC £¡Zt−11 + 1, 0¢ , St − 1¤ ≥bΠ1 £¡Zt−11 + 1, 1¢ , St¤− bΠ1 £¡Zt−11 , 1¢ , St + 1¤−AC £¡Zt−11 + 1, 1¢ , St¤.
By (2) in theorem 5, it suﬃces to show thatbΠ1 £¡Zt−11 + 1, 0¢ , St − 1¤−bΠ1 £¡Zt−11 , 0¢ , St − 1¤+bΠ1 £¡Zt−11 , 0¢ , St−1 − 1¤−bΠ1 £¡Zt−11 , 0¢ , St¤ ≥ bΠ1 £¡Zt−11 + 1, 1¢ , St¤− bΠ1 £¡Zt−11 , 1¢ , St¤+bΠ1 £¡Zt−11 , 1¢ , St−1¤− bΠ1 £¡Zt−11 , 1¢ , St + 1¤.
This follows from bΠ1Z1Z2 < 0; bΠ1Z1S < 0; bΠ1Z2S > 0; bΠ1SS > 0.
(iiid) An acquisition by firm 1 is more valuable when firm 2 does not carry
out an acquisition than when it does: bΠ1 £¡Zt−11 + 1, Zt−12 ¢ , St − 1¤ −
29
bΠ1 £¡Zt−11 , Zt−12 ¢ , St¤−AC £¡Zt−11 + 1, Zt−12 ¢ , St − 1¤ ≥bΠ1 £¡Zt−11 + 1, Zt−12 + 1¢ , St − 2¤− bΠ1 £¡Zt−11 , Zt−12 + 1¢ , St − 1¤−
AC
£¡
Zt−11 + 1, Z
t−1
2 + 1
¢
, St − 2
¤
. This follows as in (iiic), using (4)
in the theorem and bΠ1Z1Z2 < 0; bΠ1Z1S < 0; bΠ1Z2S > 0; bΠ1SS > 0.
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Entrant −→
↓ Incumbent atet = 0 atet = 1
at1 = 0 Π
L
¡
Y t−11 , F
t−1¢ , 0 ΠL ¡Y t−11 , F t−1 + 1¢ ,
ΠS
¡
Y t−11 , F
t−1 + 1
¢
−E
at1 = 1
ΠL
¡
Y t−11 + 1, F
t−1 − 1
¢
−
AC
¡
Y t−11 + 1, F
t−1 − 1
¢
, 0
ΠL
¡
Y t−11 + 1, F
t−1¢−
AC
¡
Y t−11 + 1, F
t−1¢ ,
ΠS
¡
Y t−11 + 1, F
t−1¢− E
Table 1: The Payoﬀ-Matrix for the One-Shot Game
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Figure 1: Pure Strategy Equilibria in the Static Synergy Game
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Figure 2: Pure Strategy Equilibria in the Merger for Variety Game
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Entrant1 −→
↓ Incumbent a0e0 = 0 a0e0 = 1
a01 = 0
ΠL (Y 01 , F
0)
+ΠL (Y 01 + 1, F
0 − 1)
−AC (Y 01 + 1, F 0 − 1) , 0
ΠL (Y 01 , F
0 + 1)
+ΠL (Y 01 + 1, F
0)
−AC (Y 01 + 1, F 0) ,
ΠS (Y 01 , F
0 + 1)−E
+ΠS (Y 01 + 1, F
0)
a01 = 1
ΠL (Y 01 + 1, F
0 − 1)− AC0
+ΠL (Y 01 + 2, F
0 − 2)
−AC (Y 01 + 2, F 0 − 2) , 0
ΠL (Y 01 + 1, F
0)− AC1+
ΠL (Y 01 + 2, F
0 − 1)
−AC (Y 01 + 2, F 0 − 1) ,
ΠS (Y 01 + 1, F
0)−E
+ΠS (Y 01 + 2, F
0 − 1)
Table 2: The First-Period Payoﬀ Matrix
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